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Abstract
Outreach and communication with the public have substantial value in polar research, where
studies often find changes of global importance that are happening far out of sight from the
majority of people living at lower latitudes. Seeking evidence on the effectiveness of outreach
programs, the U.S. National Science Foundation sponsored large-scale survey assessments
before and after the International Polar Year in 2007/2008. Polar-knowledge questions have
subsequently been tested and refined through other nationwide and regional surveys. More than a
decade of such work has established that basic but fairly specific knowledge questions, with all
answer choices sounding plausible but one being uniquely correct, can yield highly replicable
results. Those results, however, paint a mixed picture of knowledge. Some factual questions
seem to be interpreted by many respondents as if they had been asked for their personal beliefs
about climate change, so their responses reflect sociopolitical identity rather than physical-world
knowledge. Other factual questions, by design, do not link in obvious ways to climate-change
beliefs — so responses have simpler interpretations in terms of knowledge gaps, and education
needs.

Background
Global climate change is, by many indicators, happening “first and worst” in polar regions such
as the Antarctic Peninsula or the Arctic (AMAP, 2019; IPCC, 2014; Schoolmeester et al., 2019).
Such regions seem remote from the perspective of lower-latitude population centers, but polar
change has global implications for sea level, ocean circulation and weather. Many polar
scientists, seeing the speed of change and its global connections, engage in outreach efforts to
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communicate their research to the public (e.g., SEARCH, 2019; SIPN, 2019). Accompanying
science communication efforts has been a growing interest in finding out, through the use of
surveys, what the non-scientist public understands or believes about polar regions.
A number of surveys have sought the views of people living within far northern regions
themselves on climate change and other topics. One of the first and most ambitious, although not
focused on climate change, was the international Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic
(SLiCA; for an overview see Eliassen et al., 2012). Other northern surveys include Leiserowitz
and Craciun (2006) on Alaska; Craciun Research (2010) on Alaska’s Northwest Arctic Borough;
the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program (2015) surveys in northern and southern Canada,
Alaska and the continental U.S., Russia, and five Nordic countries; Hamilton et al. (2017) on
Alaska and other U.S. states; Anisimov and Orttung (2018) on northern Russia; and Minor et al.
(2019) on Greenland. A common theme emerging from diverse studies is that northern residents
recognize the reality of climate change, often from its local manifestations, and are concerned
about adverse effects. At the same time, northerners appear no more likely than their southern
compatriots, and perhaps even less so, to attribute climate change to human causes that should be
addressed through fossil-fuel use reductions.
A few of these surveys permit comparisons between the Arctic knowledge of northern and nonnorthern residents within particular countries. Knowledge about northern Canada proves limited
among southern Canadians (Munk-Gordon, 2015), as does knowledge about Arctic Alaska
among residents of other U.S. states (Institute of the North, 2013) — although even among
Alaskans, most of whom live in more southerly parts of the state, barely half know that the U.S.
has territory and population north of the Arctic Circle (Hamilton et al., 2017).
A somewhat distinct line of cumulative research, since 2006, has focused on assessing polar
science knowledge among mid-latitude populations such as the lower U.S. states. Through
iterations on broad nationwide surveys, these studies refined the art of asking good questions,
and incidentally discovered that there are two kinds of knowledge: factual items that are, or are
not, commonly answered on the basis of individuals’ sociopolitical identity instead of physicalworld knowledge.
The First General U.S. Polar Surveys
In 2006, anticipating research and education activities planned for the International Polar Year
(IPY, 2007–2008), the Office of Polar Programs together with the Social, Behavioral, and
Economic Science Directorate of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) designed a set of
survey questions to assess general-public knowledge about polar regions. These questions,
roughly modeled on longstanding NSF studies of science literacy (National Science Board,
2010), were developed through an iterative process of discussion, review and pre-testing. Their
content reflected contemporary scientific concerns about polar-region change, such as the
impacts of warming on land and sea ice, ecosystems and people. The polar questions were
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incorporated into the 2006 and 2010 General Social Survey (GSS; Smith, Davern, Freese, &
Morgan, 2019), to give nationally-representative benchmarks before and after IPY.
Test questions were meant to be straightforward, as thought necessary for public comprehension
on this first-of-its-kind polar knowledge survey. For example, asking about ice trends:
Would you say the polar ice caps have gotten larger or smaller over the last 25 years?
Seventy-seven percent of the 2006 GSS respondents (n = 1,853), and 81% of the 2010
respondents (n = 697), chose “smaller” (Hamilton, Cutler, and Schaefer, 2012a), which was
intended to be the accurate response. High nominal accuracy, and a small though statistically
significant improvement from 2006 to 2010, offered a generally positive portrait of polar
literacy. Interpretation before critical audiences was undercut, however, by the question’s
ambiguity. Do “polar ice caps” refer to land ice, sea ice, or some combination of both? What
metric defines size for each feature? Should seasonality be specified, since summer trends may
differ from winter? A uniquely true answer to the survey question might be elusive, depending
on how such ambiguities are resolved. Figure 1, graphing data from the National Snow and Ice
Data Center (NSIDC, 2020), illustrates the complications even if we focus only on sea ice, and
on the minimum extent reached each year. From the start of modern satellite measurements
(1979) through the GSS years of 2006 or 2010, minimum sea ice extent was clearly trending
down in the Arctic, but not so in the Antarctic — where the highest minima of the satellite era
occurred in 2003 and 2008. (Since 2010, however, Arctic, Antarctic and global sea ice extent all
set new record lows.) Trends for East Antarctica, by far the largest mass of land ice, were even
less clear-cut at the time of these GSS surveys, with large uncertainties and conflicting estimates
regarding mass balance.
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Figure 1: Minimum daily extent of Antarctic and Arctic sea ice (1979–2020), calculated from
National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC, 2020) data.
Sharper Questions
I was not involved with the GSS study’s design or execution, becoming aware of this fascinating
project only after publication of the 2006 survey data by the National Opinion Research Center
(NORC, 2019). No one else seemed to be working with these data, so I wrote up the first detailed
analysis in an Arctic, Antarctic, and Alpine Research article (Hamilton, 2008). Subsequent
publication of 2010 GSS data allowed tests for post-IPY changes, which proved to be detectable
although not large (Hamilton, Cutler, and Schaeffer, 2012a, 2012b). Presenting these results
before skeptical audiences, however, brought home the problem with interpreting very general
questions as indicators of knowledge. Seeking a more definitive alternative, I drafted a question
about ice trends that, without being much more complex, specified not only the time frame (past
few years vs. 30 years ago), but also the location (Arctic Ocean), season (late summer), and
metric (area) — making one answer unambiguously correct. The order of response choices was
rotated in telephone interviews.
Which of the following three statements do you think is more accurate? Over the past few years,
the ice on the Arctic Ocean in late summer . . .
- Covers less area than it did 30 years ago (correct)
- Declined but then recovered to about the same area it had 30 years ago
- Covers more area than it did 30 years ago
4

The National Community and Environment in Rural America (NCERA) survey, despite its name
a nationally representative sample, included this question in 2011 (Hamilton, 2012). Unlike the
GSS, which employs primarily face-to-face interviews, NCERA interviews were conducted over
the telephone by trained interviewers at the University of New Hampshire Survey Center, calling
randomly-selected numbers nationwide. As with the GSS, weights proportional to the inverse
probability of selection were calculated to adjust for known design bias, and for sampling bias
inferred from comparisons with Census data. Such weights are applied to all graphs and analyses
in this article. Figure 2 compares responses to the old and new ice-trend questions, from 2010
GSS and 2011 NCERA surveys.

Figure 2: Responses to differently-worded questions about polar ice trends, asked on the 2010
General Social Survey and the 2011 NCERA survey. See Hamilton et al. (2012a) and Hamilton
(2012) regarding the GSS and NCERA surveys, respectively.
In this newer ice question, the “declined but then recovered” option intentionally echoed
arguments promoted by climate denialists who were focusing on short-term variation to counter
scientific observations of decadal decline (e.g., Idso and Singer, 2009; discussed in Hamilton,
2012). This NCERA response choice proved more popular than the GSS question’s “same”
response, and particularly so among people who, according to another question on the same
survey, did not believe anthropogenic climate change is happening. To a lesser degree, that
subgroup also favored “more area.” Overall, however, the two distributions in Figure 2 are not
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strikingly different, and the nominally correct responses have similar demographic predictors in
both cases (comparing GSS analysis in Hamilton et al. 2012b with NCERA analysis in Hamilton
2012). Two-thirds of NCERA respondents chose the scientifically accurate “less area.” The
advantages of more precise wording mainly involved cleaner interpretation, and detection of
patterns in systematically wrong answers (Hamilton, 2012), rather than different main
conclusions.
Other polar-knowledge questions have subsequently been developed with the same philosophy:
addressing important but very basic facts (not trivia, or numerical specifics) the informed public
might reasonably know; using neutral but fairly precise wording; and offering answers that all
sound plausible although only one is clearly correct. For example, the following question was
asked on the Polar, Environment, and Science (POLES) survey in 2016, again with rotated
response choices.
Which best describes the North Pole?
- Ice a few feet or yards thick, over a deep ocean (correct)
- Ice more than a mile thick, over land
- A rocky, mountainous landscape
Figure 3, updated from Hamilton (2016), charts the nationwide POLES survey results alongside
results from a series of statewide New Hampshire surveys, the Granite State Poll (GSP), which
tell the same story. New Hampshire often proves to be a reasonable and cost-effective proxy for
nationwide surveys on climate, polar and other science-related topics (e.g., Hamilton 2016;
Hamilton, Hartter, & Bell, 2019).
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Figure 3: North Pole question responses from the nationwide POLES surveys (2016) and a
series of statewide New Hampshire surveys (2016–2019), updated from Hamilton (2016).
Fewer than half of the POLES or GSP respondents in Figure 3 recognized that the North Pole is
on sea ice, over an ocean. Similar proportions thought it was either on thick ice over land, or a
rocky, mountainous landscape — suggesting they do not accurately visualize a globe, or know
basic geography. Compared with the ice trend results in Figure 2, the North Pole results in Figure
3 suggest much lower public knowledge about polar regions. Moreover, the two results seem
paradoxical: How could so many of the same survey respondents accurately report that Arctic
Ocean ice area has declined, and yet not know where that ocean and ice are?
Two Kinds of Knowledge
The paradox is resolved through closer analysis of these questions and others, revealing “two
kinds” of polar-related facts: those that can, and those that cannot, be guessed from more general
beliefs about climate change (Hamilton, 2015a), which in contemporary America covaries
closely with sociopolitical identity (Shwom et al., 2015). Thus, people whose identity inclines
them to reject the scientific consensus on climate change will also more often say that Arctic sea
ice has recovered, or that global CO2 levels are not changing. Such counterfactual propositions
conform better to beliefs that anthropogenic climate change is not happening, and are actively
promoted by media and political figures to support climate-change denial (Dunlap & McCright,
2015). Conversely, people who accept the scientific consensus on climate change more often
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respond accurately about sea ice or CO2, whether informed by physical-world knowledge or their
more general climate beliefs. Interestingly, people who say they are unsure about climate change
often exhibit greater accuracy on the climate-linked questions than people who reject
anthropogenic climate change (Hamilton, 2012).
Responses to climate belief-linked factual questions consequently present an intractable mixture
of objective knowledge with sociopolitical identity. But whatever one’s position on climate
change, it whispers no clues about the North Pole’s location. This illustrates a second kind of
question that has direct relevance for understanding climate change, but for which one’s beliefs
about the reality of climate change do not suggest a particular answer. Responses to such
questions are consequently more interpretable as indicators of knowledge. Table 1 lists six
examples of knowledge questions, representing both types, which have been asked on recent
surveys.
Responses to belief-linked climate or polar questions diagnostically exhibit political gradients
like those in the top two panels of Figure 4. A 35-point gap separates Democrats from Tea Party
supporters on the reality of sea ice decline. Regarding CO2 trends this gap widens to 40 points.
Some people are giving scientifically accurate answers, while others answer questions about
scientifically-established facts as if they had been asked, instead, for their personal opinions
about climate change — or more basically, about who they are. Presumably some of the accurate
answers also stem from sociopolitical beliefs rather than physical-world knowledge, but in those
cases the sociopolitical beliefs are informed by science (Hamilton, 2018; Hamilton and Fogg,
2019). Similar gradients in accuracy on belief-linked questions occur if we break down responses
by self-assessed ideology, or even by approval of President Trump (Hamilton, 2016, 2019). In
the U.S. today, climate beliefs correlate with virtually any measure of sociopolitical identity so
consistently that they could serve as markers for such identity, nearly as valid as typical
questions about ideology or political party (Kahan, 2015). Certain non-climate topics such as
fossil fuel vs. renewable energy development, and the need for species or ecosystem protection,
exhibit milder degrees of this attribute (e.g., Hamilton et al., 2019).
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Figure 4: Percentage of accurate responses to six factual questions, by respondent’s political
identity (POLES US surveys 2016). P-values shown are probabilities from adjusted Wald tests in
weighted logit regressions.
The four lower panels in Figure 4 illustrate the contrasting profiles of belief-neutral questions.
Political differences are smaller (11 points or less), do not form clear gradients, and here are not
statistically significant. That is not to assert that no political differences should exist on beliefneutral questions of fact, or that responses must be uncorrelated with climate views; other
evidence suggests they are not (Hamilton, 2018; Hamilton and Fogg, 2019). But the neutral
questions provide more interpretable indicators of knowledge for such research, being less
confounded with sociopolitical identity and climate beliefs at the start. They make better sense
also for regional comparisons, such as testing to what extent Alaska residents know more than
other Americans about the Arctic (Hamilton et al., 2017).
Implications
My comments have focused on polar knowledge of the U.S. general public, but the
recommendations for nontrivial yet clear knowledge questions, and for caution when interpreting
responses that could be inferred (right or wrongly) from individuals’ climate-change beliefs,
should apply for nonpolar topics, and beyond the U.S. Correlations between climate-change
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beliefs and sociopolitical identity have been observed in many countries (McCright, Dunlap, and
Marquart-Pyatt, 2015), although such correlations are particularly strong in the U.S. and, perhaps
to a growing degree, other Anglophone countries. For comparison with U.S. patterns, the
Australian Social Survey in 2017 carried the North Pole and several other knowledge questions
listed in Table 1. Tranter (2019) reports results broadly similar to those from US studies.
Good polar knowledge questions, for use among non-scientists, should not be arguably
ambiguous, such as “Have the polar ice caps decreased?” Neither should they be so specific as to
mainly invoke guesswork, such as “By what percentage did September Arctic sea ice area
change from 1979 to 2019?” Preferably, the knowledge questions should address major
qualitative facts relevant to the topic at hand, salient enough that informed non-scientists might
be aware. The answer choices should be neutrally worded and cover plausible alternatives — but
with one choice being unambiguously correct. Within the range of such “good” knowledge
questions, however, we see two basic kinds: questions for which an individual’s sociopolitical
identity does, or does not, suggest obvious answers. Both kinds can assess knowledge, but in one
case objective knowledge is constrained by identity, making interpretation more complicated.
Sociopolitical identity offers no clues, however, about whether the North Pole is over land ice or
sea ice. Identity-linked climate beliefs do offer obvious clues about whether Arctic sea ice area
has declined compared with 30 years ago, and may even incline people to discredit scientists
who say that it has.
To be sure, identity clues could push in either direction. Liberals and moderates, or people who
accept the reality of climate change, would be more inclined to answer (correctly) that sea ice
declined, even in the absence of real knowledge. Identity-linked acceptance of climate change is
informed in the first place, however, by scientific evidence, which liberals and moderates are
more inclined to trust generally (Gauchat, 2012; Nadelson et al., 2014) and with respect to
specific topics ranging from climate change and evolution to nuclear power and vaccines
(Hamilton 2015b; Hamilton et al. 2015). Thus, some liberals or moderates who agree that sea ice
declined might base that on their own knowledge, or they might just be following their partisan
elites. But even in the latter case those partisan elites take their own clues from science. Identitylinked knowledge questions can be studied for insights on politically selective information
aquisition, a focus of much current research. Identity-neutral knowledge questions have value for
other purposes such as identification of individuals and areas where a simple knowledge gaps
exist, which could be addressed through education to build a better foundation for understanding
polar change.
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Table 1: Six questions of two different kinds, asked on surveys to assess polar knowledge
(answers rotated in interviews, to avoid bias). See Hamilton (2018) for response distributions
from nationwide surveys.
Climate belief-linked questions
Which of the following three statements do you think is more accurate? Over the past few years, the ice
on the Arctic Ocean in late summer . . .
Covers less area than it did 30 years ago (correct)
Declined but then recovered to about the same area it had 30 years ago
Covers more area than it did 30 years ago
Which of the following three statements do you think is more accurate? Scientific measurements have
confirmed that in recent decades, the concentration of CO2 or carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere
is . . .
Increasing (correct)
Staying about the same
Decreasing

Climate-relevant but belief-neutral questions
Which best describes the North Pole?
Ice a few feet or yards thick, over a deep ocean (correct)
Ice more than a mile thick, over land
A rocky, mountainous landscape
Which best describes the South Pole?
Ice a few feet or yards thick, over a deep ocean
Ice more than a mile thick, over land (correct)
A rocky, mountainous landscape
Which of the following possible changes would, if it happened, do the most to raise sea levels?
Melting of sea ice on the Arctic Ocean
Melting of land ice in Greenland and the Antarctic (correct)
Melting of glaciers in the Himalayan and Alaska
Which country has territory and thousands of people living north of the Arctic Circle?
United States (correct)
China
Estonia
Britain
none of these
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